
Volg hier live de ondervraging en lees hier wat al gezegd is.
En een samenvatting van de onderzoekscommissie tot nu toe:
2.17pm: Lyne says he is going to turn to the legal issues.
He says he is going to summarise what the inquiry has heard already. (That's new. It's not a procedure they have used before.)
Lyne says there was no legal basis for regime change. Laywers in the US favoured the "revival argument", using the authorisation for the use of force contained in UNSCR 678. But the UK lawyers felt there had to be a fresh UN resolution. The UN adopted 1441. But there were different interpretations as to whether that authorised war without a second resolution. Lord Goldsmith was telling Blair until February 2002 that there would have to be a second resolution. Is that a fair summary, Lyne asks.
Blair agrees.
Lyne continues his summary. Goldsmith then submitted his advice. He said a second resolution would be the "safest course". But he said a "reasonable case" could be made that a second resolution was not necessary. Goldsmith said a reasonable case did not mean he would be confident of winning if the case ever went to court. By this stage Goldsmith had parted company from the Foreign Office lawyers. Goldsmith said he was then asked to provide a "yes or no" decision. By March 13 he had decided to give a clear statement saying there was no need for a second resolution. But Goldsmith did need a determination that Iraq was in breach of its UN obligations. The Foreign Office lawyers thought that only the security council could give that determination. But Goldsmith said a member state could give that determination. He got Blair to provide a statement to that effect.
Is that a fair summary, Lyne asks.
Blair makes one point. What was important to him about 1441 was not just that it declared Saddam in breach, but that it said a failure by Iraq to comply unconditionally and immediately constituted a further material breach, Blair says.
Lyne asks if Blair sought legal advice from Goldsmith while he was preparing for war in 2002.
Blair says he got a paper from the Foreign Office in March.
Lyne asks why he did not consult Goldsmith at that stage.
Blair says that what the Foreign Office was saying was consistent with what Goldsmith thought at that stage.
Lyne says Goldsmith did not attend cabinet meetings. He was being excluded. Why was he not included more closely?
Blair says that Goldsmith was involved in that he decided to write to Blair "of his own initiative" in July.
Lyne says that when Goldsmith went to cabinet on March 17 2003, that was only his second appearance at cabinet.
Blair says Goldsmith was a "lawyer's lawyer". He was a lawyer "of the first rank". He would give advice whether it was wanted or not.
Lyne says that when Goldsmith wrote to Blair in July 2002, he got the impression his advice was "not particularly welcome".
Blair says that he had many other issues to consider. But getting the advice was "very helpful". It focused Blair's mind. Goldsmith wanted to make the point that it was not just important to get a UN resolution. It had to be the right resolution.
Lyne says Goldsmith told Downing Street he thought 1441 would not justify war without a second resolution in late 2002. Goldsmith was not asked to offer formal advice. Would it not have been better if he had submitted formal advice at that point, Lyne asks.
Blair says he had begun military preparations before he got 1441. He had to do that. But if Goldsmith had said the war was illegal, Britain would not gone to war.
Lyne suggests it would have been better to get that advice before troops were despatched to the Gulf.
Blair says he knew what Goldsmith thought.
Lyne says Goldsmith was not giving Blair options. He was saying there had to be a second UN resolution. Would it not have been better to know then that he did not need a second resolution?
Blair says there was a disagreement about 1441. (He is not answering Lyne's question.)
Blair says Goldsmith came to the view that the breach by Saddam of 1441 was sufficient.
Lyne asks about the legal advice given by Goldsmith on March 7 2003. What discussions did Blair have with Goldsmith after March 7 and before Goldsmith firmed up his advice?
Blair says the whole point about 1441 was that it was a "last chance" for Iraq.
He recalls a conversation with Bush in October 2002. He said to Bush: "If he complies, that's it."
Lyne asks about evidence saying the British told the Americans in early 2003 that a second resolution was essential.
Blair says that was the legal advice at the time.
Lyne suggests it must have been a "considerable relief" when Goldsmith said there was no need for a second resolution.
Blair accepts that.
Lyne points out that Goldsmith was in disagreement with the Foreign Office lawyers.
Were other countries arguing in favour of the revival argument, Lyne asks.
Blair says countries that supported the war thought it had a legal basis.
Samenvatting tweede deel:
• Blair said that if Saddam had not been removed in 2003, he would pose a greater threat now. He described this as the "2010 question". Instead of asking whether it was right to remove Saddam in 2003, the inquiry should ask what would have happened if he had not been removed. He also insisted that Britain might have to take action to deal with a rogue state posing a WMD threat again. (See 11.51am and 12.23pm)
• Blair appeared to say that publishing the dossier on Iraq's WMD was a mistake. He said it would be better to publish the reports from the joint intelligence committee. (See 11.37am)
• He said he disagreed with witnesses like Jeremy Greenstock and David Manning who said the weapons inspectors should have been given more time. (See 12.35pm)
• He said it would have been impractical for British and American troops to remain on the border of Iraq for months. (See 12.05pm)
• He insisted that there was evidence to suggest that the WMD threat from Iraq was "growing". (See 11.51am)
• He denied claims made in earlier hearings that he stopped the Ministry of Defence ordering vital equipment when it wanted in 2002 because he did not want people to find out he was preparing for war. He said that if the MoD had insisted that it needed to start the procurement process earlier, he would have agreed. (See 12pm)
• He said that some unspecified Arab countries told him they were keen on "getting Saddam out" if there had been a second UN resolution. (See 12.31pm)
• Blair appeared to criticise Hans Blix, the UN weapons inspector, for changing his story about what happened in 2003. (See 12.35pm)
• Blair said that the military wanted to make a large contribution to the war because they wanted to be "at the centre of things". (See 11.12am)
• He identified William Hague, the former Tory leader, as one of the politicians urging him before the war to be more aggressive towards Iraq, not less aggressive. Denis MacShane made a similar point in the article I mentioned earlier. (See 11.37am)
Hoofdpunten deel 1:
10.54am: Here are the main points.
• Blair strongly denied doing any secret deal with Bush at the meeting in Crawford in April 2002. He said he was quite open about his determination to deal with Saddam Hussein. He insisted that he made this point publicly in the press conference he held with Bush. (See 10.26am)
• He said that did not set conditions when he told Bush that he would support him in his drive to deal with Iraq. Blair said the US/UK relationship was an alliance, not a contract. (See 10.26am)
• He suggested that there was no real difference between wanting regime change and wanting Iraq to disarm. (See 10.20am)
• But he also admitted that he made a misake when he gave an interview to Fern Britton last year and said that he would have wanted to get rid of Saddam even if he had know Iraq had no WMD. (See 10.05am)
• Sir John Chilcot signalled that Blair is likely to be called to give evidence again. (See 9.32am)
• Blair said he was "frustrated" by George Bush's unwillingness to make more progress on the Middle East in 2002 and 2003. (See 10.39am and 10.43am)
Hij antwoord wel , maar vaak niet op de vragen....
Wel wordt duidelijk dat hij wel een vreemde kijk heeft op zaken waardoor hij wellicht als mediator aan gewicht zal verliezen...
An van den
burg 29-01-2010 12:33
de oude koloniale eerste wereld. De botsing van beschavingen ziet hij als=====
Wil hij die terug?? Die is nooit weggeweest!!!
An van den
burg 29-01-2010 12:36
Deze oorlogsmisdadiger behoort in de bak te zitten i.p.v de Intermediair van het Midden- Oosten te zijn.
Schaamteloos Fascistische Westen!
An van den
burg 29-01-2010 12:51
Geschiedenis van Japan, atoombommen op Hiroshima en NagasakiAchtergronden van het werpen van atoombommen door de Amerikanen op de Japanse steden Hiroshima en Nagasaki in augustus 1945, met het doel een eind aan de ...
www.uchiyama.nl/ngabommen.htm - Vergelijkbaar -
Het is niet "jou reet" , maar jouw reet! Bezittelijk voornaamwoord, weet je wel. Dombo!
An van den burg 29-01-2010 12:30
====== Since the Holocaust, it has been almost impossible to hide large-scale crimes against humanity. In our communicative world, few modern catastrophes are concealed from the public eye. And yet, Ilan Pappe unveils, one such crime has been erased from the global public memory: the ethnic cleansing of the Palestinians in 1948. But why is it denied, and by whom? The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine offers an investigation of this mystery.======
Ilan Pappe: The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine.
Ina
Dijstelberge 29-01-2010
13:34
Ik heb hem als 'mediator"nooit zien zitten en nu onderstreept hij opnieuw het waarom.
The west must and shall rule the world......
twee citaatjes:
( N.a. 9/11)That completely changed our assessment of where the risk lay .. From that moment, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Iraq ... all of this had to be brought to an end.
I think it is at least arguable that he was a threat and had we taken that decision to leave him there ... with the oil price $100 a barrel, he would have had the intent and he would have had the means, and we would have lost our nerve.
Wordt jij nu nooit eens moe van jezelf trolletrutje?....
En die cijfers?..komen die nog?....ook nog wat inhoudelijk op mijn reacties?.....of blijft het , zoals te doen gebruikelijk , bij blaffen?..
Ik reageer weer op je onzin als je de helderheid kunt vinden om je stellingen te onderbouwen met feiten ipv met slechts je verwerpelijke kronkels...zullen we dat zo afspreken?....en oja..iemand wijzen op een " w " of niet zegt meer over jou [w] dan over die " w "....dat doen pubers op de middelbare school onderling ook als ze , net als jij , verbaal grond verliezen....LOL
Met excuus voor het off-topic Ina...maar moest deze internet trolletrut even te woord staan...er schoot haar blijkbaar nog wat te binnen van het vorige topic....
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INITIATIEF VAN



Als hij dat nou als analyse bracht, dan was het nog verdedigbaar. Nee, Blair beleefde dat zo.....
Daar wringt voor mij steeds de schoen bij het terugkijken op de gehele gang van zaken.
Hij signaleert dat we in een wereld leven waarin alles en iedereen van elkaar afhangt. Dat
zou hem eigenlijk moeten ingeven dat we dan ook onszelf goed moeten beheersen.
Welnee, Blair wil de afhankelijkheid terug van de tweede en de derde wereld van
de oude koloniale eerste wereld. De botsing van beschavingen ziet hij als
een mogelijkheid om held te worden, terwijl we in de geschiedenis
slechts onderdrukking zien ontstaan waar een beschaving
met geweld de baas speelt.